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Abstract 
This study was conducted with the objective of analyzing the association of group, lender, and socio-economic factors 
with group loan repayment performance of the beneficiaries of DECSI operating in the manufacturing sector as group 
owned MSEs. Primary data was collected from 34 selected group leaders of the group owned MSEs borrowers by 
using structured questionnaire and depth-interview. Chi-square test employed to analyze the association of group 
related factors, lender related factors, and socio-economic related factor with group loan repayment performance. The 
statistical test revealed that self initiation, peer pressure, suitable loan repayment period, training, and external shocks 
have statistically significant association with loan repayment performance of the group borrowers; whereas 
homogeneity, internal and regulation, loan size, and loan supervision are found to have statistically insignificant 
association with group loan repayment performance, though they make difference on loan repayment performance of 
the group borrowers. Therefore, to improve the loan repayment performance of the group borrowers, DECSI, among 
others, should consider the statistically significant factors while offering group loan; and should focus on the 
repayment challenges which are stated by the borrowers (market linkage and loan supervision), and take corrective 
actions. Finally, further research on similar area is suggested by considering factors that need solution such as 
experience of group borrowers in the sector, group size, and lack of land; besides similar study may be conducted in 
other sectors of the MSEs (i.e., construction, urban agriculture, and service and trade) in order to have a holistic 
understanding of about the determinants of group loan repayment performance. 
Keywords:Chi-square, DECSI, Determinant Factors, Group Loan, Logit, Manufacturing Sector, Mekelle 
Microfinance, MSEs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the association of group, lender, and socio-economic factors with the 
group loan repayment performance of the beneficiaries of DECSI microfinance institution. Specifically, the 
study was addressing groups that are engaging in manufacturing sector found in Mekelle city. It was attempting 
to analyze the common assumption that group lending leads to good repayment rates by examining what 
countervailing processes may affect group loan repayment. 
Microfinance is often defined as financial services for poor and low-income clients offered by different types of service 
providers. In practice, the term is often used more narrowly to refer to loans and other services from providers that 
identify themselves as “microfinance institutions” (MFIs).  It has grown in prominence since Muhammad Yunus started 
the Grameen Bank Project in 1976. The Grameen bank of Bangladesh, which was founded by Mohammad Yunus was 
one of the first microfinance institutions (MFIs). Mohammad Yunus came upon a group of villagers that were unable to 
pay off their debt to a money collector. These methods include group lending and liability, pre-loan savings 
requirements, gradually increasing loan sizes, and an implicit guarantee of ready access to future loans if present loans 
are repaid fully and promptly. It is an important strategy to alleviating poverty in developing countries (Cabraal, Russell, 
& Singh, 2006, as cited by Fikirte, 2011). 
Microfinance institutions are primarily expected to provide various a permanent access to appropriate financial 
services such as credit, savings, micro-insurance, remittances, leasing to low-income clients including consumers 
and the self employed, who traditionally lack access to banking and related services. It is rather an important tool 
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for the eradication of poverty (Jegatheesan, Ganesh, & Kumar, 2011). 
In addition to financial services, some MFIs provide social intermediation services such as the formation of 
groups, development of self confidence and the training of members in that group on financial literacy and 
management. The target group of MFIs are self employed low income entrepreneurs who are; traders, 
seamstresses, street vendors, small farmers, hairdressers, rickshaw drivers, artisans blacksmith etc (Robinson, 
2003). 
One of the most characteristics of microfinance institution is extending loan to the poor and low income people 
through group without asking for collateral, but it serve as collateral. Therefore, in microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) group lending is a lending to groups of members of a community who have come together with the goal 
of reinforcing their creditworthiness. It allows a group of individuals - often called a solidarity group - to provide 
collateral or loan guarantee through a group repayment pledge (Ralph, 2011).  
It is since the 1970s that, group-lending programs have been promoted in many developing countries. Most 
schemes make members jointly liable for the repayment of loans and give subsequent credit only if all members 
of the group have fully repaid. The joint liability but possibly more so, the threat of losing access to future credit 
incites members to perform various functions, including screening of loan applicants; monitoring the individual 
borrower’s efforts, fortunes, and shocks; and enforcing repayment of their peers’ loans (Zeller, 1998). 
According to Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), joint liability leads to an enhanced repayment performance through 
lessening the four major problems facing formal credit institutions in lending to the poor. These problems are: (a) to 
ascertain what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (the problem of adverse selection), (b) to make sure they will 
utilize the loan once made, properly, so that they will be able to repay it (the problem of moral hazard), (c) to find out 
how their  project really did in case they declares their inability to repay (auditing or monitoring) and (d) to find 
methods to force the borrower to repay the loan if she is reluctant to do so (the enforcement problem). 
Even though joint-liability lending have been proposed that various aspects of microcredit’s informational and 
enforcement in loan repayment advantages over other forms of lending, Norhaziah and Mohdnoor (2013) argued 
that examining repayment performance is important because, if borrowers do not repay, then there may not be 
sufficient funds to ensure that the liquidity position of the MFI is maintained. When there is a loss in the MFI 
liquidity due to high levels of non-repayment, the cyclical flow of funds between the MFI and the borrowers will 
be interrupted. The result of this is a reduction in the efficiency of the MFIs operation. To attain financial 
viability, MFI must reach operational self-sufficiency first and in order to attain operational self-sufficiency, the 
MFI must ensure that the operational cost can cover non-financial expenses. This can be achieved by low 
delinquency where the MFI must maintain a low delinquency rate to ensure operational self-sufficiency.  
To sum up, this study was examining the association of group, lender, and socio-economic factors with group 
loan repayment in DECSI microfinance institution. Specifically, the study has covered groups of borrowers who 
took loan from DECSI microfinance institution to work together in manufacturing activities in Mekelle city, 
Tigray, Ethiopia from 2009-2013 operation years. Also, the study has focused on the extent to which group 
related factors (i.e., demographic characteristics of members and group-specific factors), socio-economic factors, 
and lender related factors that may influence group loan repayment performance.  
 
2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Loan repayment performance is affected by a number of socio-demographic of group members, group specific 
factors and lender/institutional factors. While some of the factors positively influence the loan repayment, the 
other factors negatively affect the repayment rate. Regarding to the group loan repayment performance of 
borrowers, several studies have been conducted in many countries by different researchers and summarized 
below.  
2.2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES  
A study undertaken by Bassem (2008), on main factors vulnerable to affect the repayment performance of group 
lending in Tunisia reveal that the repayment is influenced positively by the internal rule of conduct, the same 
business, the knowledge of the other members of the group before his formation, the peer pressure, the self-
selection, the sex, the education, and the non financial services and tie with the loan officer. However, the 
homogeneity, and the marital status are among the main factors acting negatively on the repayment performance 
of credit groups. 
A study on group size and social ties in microfinance institutions conducted by Abbinki, Irlenbusch, and Renner 
(2006) indicated that microfinance programs provided poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-
selected groups. Follow-up loans provided incentives to repay. In this study they experimentally investigated the 
influence of those features on strategic defaults. Each group member invested in an individual risky project, 
whose outcome was known only to the individual investors. Subjects decide whether to contribute to group 
repayment or not. Only those with successful projects could contribute. The experiment ended if too few repay. 
This investigated group size and social ties effected and observed robust high repayment rates. 
A study conducted by Wenner (1995) on group credit as a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment 
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performance in Costa Rica found that members of groups engaged in formal screening with an internal code of regulations 
had a low probability for delinquency, indicating that screening indeed resulted in an informational efficiency gain, a result 
which is supported by Zeller (1998). 
A study on key factors of joint-liability loan contracts by Alexander and Denitsa (2004) reported that joint liability 
induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. Furthermore, the incentive system leads to peer-measures between 
the borrowers, helping the lender to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. They also demonstrate that 
the mechanism realizes high repayment rates, if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening 
and enforcement process.  
Another study was conducted by Onyeagocha, Chidebelu, Okorji, Ada-Henri, Osuji and Korie (2012) on an 
examination of determinants of loan repayment of microfinance institutions in southeast states of Nigeria reveal 
that out of nine explanatory variables, five variables were found to be significant for the probability of being 
defaulter; that is group size, shocks, training duration, loan size and credit officers experience were significantly 
influencing loan repayment performance of MFIs. However, the remaining four explanatory variables namely, 
gender, age, interest rate and methodology had no significant effect on the loan repayment performance. 
Roslan and Mohd (2009) undertook a study on the determinants of loan repayment among microcredit borrowers 
in Malaysia by dividing determinants into three categories- characteristics of borrowers, characteristics of the 
project or business and the characteristics of the loan. Their result indicated that the probability for loan 
repayment default was influenced by the gender of the borrower, type of business activity, amount of loan, 
repayment period and training. 
Determinants of repayment performance of credit groups in Madagascar were analyzed by Zeller (1996). He 
found that groups with higher level of social cohesion have a better repayment rate. Moreover, the programs that 
provide saving service to their members have a significantly higher repayment rate. 
Julia (1996) studied the determinants of successful group loan repayment in Burkina Faso. This study revealed 
that probability of loan repayment is influenced by effective use of group dynamics (ex ante and ex post peer 
pressure and group solidarity) as well as other factors such as appropriate training and leadership; homogeneous 
groups with sufficient training and reliable leaders had the highest probability of repaying their loans; negative 
externalities like the “domino effect” occur when one or more members of a credit group default due to the 
default of other members; negative influence on repayment occurs when the credit terms and conditions are no 
longer appropriate for each member as credit cycles continue, creating an inherent “matching problem” as group 
lending is repeated over time; and  as loan sizes increase due to the dynamic incentives, preferred loan terms and 
volumes will differ with the consequence that borrowers with smaller loan volumes will reject joint-liability for 
borrowers with higher loan volumes in the same group if the latter run into repayment difficulties. 
An investigation on the key factors that influence loan repayment performance among group clients of microcredit 
institutions (MFIs) in Tanzania have been carried out by Francis and Abel (2009). According to their findings, 
experience, training time, and sanctions have positive and significant effects on loan repayment performance among 
group clients of MFIs. However, transaction costs and group size have negative and significant effects on loan 
repayment performance. 
An investigation by Alessandra, Luke, and Bruce (2005) on the effect of social capital on group loan repayment 
found direct relationship between default and homogeneity, which is the increment in the homogeneity of the 
group members, would lead to the higher repayment. 
As per empirical analysis on determinants of repayment performance in credit groups by Zeller (1998) 
implementation of internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better repayment 
performance that is decrement in the cost of operations of the lender and decrement in the default rate. 
To sum up, as mentioned above, various studies were conducted in various countries (outside Ethiopia) on the 
determinants of group loan repayment performance. Most of these studies have identified major factors 
influencing group loan repayment performance and categorized them as group borrower specific factors (i.e., 
peer monitoring, peer pressure, self-selection, homogeneity, group size, internal rule of regulation), lender 
specific factors (i.e., loan size, training, experiences of credit officers) and socio-economic specific factor (i.e., 
external shocks) that affect principally the loan repayment rate of group borrowers.  
2.2.2.EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN ETHIOPIA 
An empirical analysis on factors that influence the loan repayment performance of the beneficiaries of Addis 
Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) was made by Fikirte (2011). Accordingly, the study revealed that out of 
twelve explanatory variables, eight variables were found to be significant for the probability of being defaulter, 
that is age and five business types (baltina & petty market, kiosk & shop, services providing, weaving & 
tailoring, and urban agriculture) were important in influencing loan repayment performance of the borrower. In 
addition, sex and business experience of the respondents were found to be significant determinants of loan 
repayment rate. However, the remaining four explanatory variables namely, education level, family size, 
business experience and dependency ratio had no significant effect on the probability of being defaulter. 
An empirical study was conducted by Amare (2005) on the determinants of loan repayment performance of 
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smallholder farmers in North Gondar, Ethiopia. A total of 15 explanatory variables were considered in the 
econometric model. Out of these, seven variables were found to significantly influence the repayment performance. 
These were land holding size of the family, agro-ecology of the area, total livestock holding, number of years of 
experience, number of contacts, sources of credit and income from off-farm activities. The remaining eight 
variables (family size, distance between main road and household residence, purpose of borrowing, loan amount, 
age of borrower, education level, gender of the household head, and expenditure for social festivals) were found to 
have insignificant effect on loan repayment performance of smallholder. 
Another study was conducted by Abraham (2002) on an examination of determinants of repayment status of 
borrowers and criteria of credit rationing with reference to private borrowers around Zeway area who are 
financed by the DBE. The result revealed that having other source of income, education, work experience in 
related economic activity before the loan and engaging on economic activities other than agriculture are 
enhancing loan recovery performance while loan diversion, being male borrower and giving extended loan 
repayment period are undermining factors of loan recovery performance. 
An investigation on the microfinance repayment performance of Oromia Credit and Saving Institution (OCSI) in 
Kuyu has been carried out by Abafita (2003). According to his finding; sex, loan size and number of dependants 
are negatively related to loan repayment and age was found to be positive. Income from activities financed by 
loan, repayment period suitability and loan supervision are positively and significantly related to loan repayment 
performance. Moreover, loan diversion is significant and negatively related to loan repayment rate. 
Generally, numbers of studies were conducted in Ethiopia on determinants of loan repayment performance of 
group based and individual based credit. The results of different studies reviewed above revealed the significant 
factors that probably affect loan repayment as age, sex, business types, business experience, land holding size, 
total livestock holding, loan size, repayment period suitability, loan supervision and loan diversion. 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As it has been reviewed from previous empirical studies in the above sections, factors that affecting group loan 
repayment performance are divided into group-specific factors (i.e. homogeneity, internal rule of regulation, self-
selection and peer pressure), lender/institution related factors (i.e. loan size, suitability of repayment period, loan 
supervision and training), and factors related to overall socio-economic which include external shocks that 
involve different types of family emergencies, sickness, output market loss, major social events, etc. Thus, this 
study has constructed the following conceptual framework (Figure 2.1) based on the empirical findings. Nine 
socio-economic factors, group specific factors and lender specific factors were identified from the empirical 
studies.  
 
As it has been shown in the above Figure 2.1, group loan repayment is affected by different factors which may 
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lead group borrowers to default loan or repay it fully. These are socio
institution factors. The socio-demographic factor is the nature of homogeneity 
age, education and marital status, which is expected to affect loan repayment positively as it is changed from 
heterogeneity to homogeneity in socio
factors that enforce the repayment of group loan to change as they change; and the lender/institution factors are 
those factors that are related with lender/microfinance institution which are expected to affect group repayment 
status.  
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Based on a preliminary data collected, default rate of last five years on average reach around 14.7% on the 
selected groups in the manufacturing sector. In view of that the past five years (2009
loan repayment performance (default ra
1.1 and Figure 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Summary of loan repayment performance in DECSI for the successive past 5years
Year 2009 
Disbursed  750,000Birr 
Loan Collected  736438.55Brr 
Loan Defaulted  13,561.45Birr 
Default rate 18.10% 
Figure 1.1: Amount of Loan Disbursed and Loan Defaulted
As the above Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 indicates even if it seems like decreasing in year 2010 operation from that 
of year 2009 ( i.e., 18.10% to 1
microfinance institution is increasing consequently for the subsequent three years (2011
group borrowers are not paying well their loan successfully from time to time
sustainability of DECSI microfinance institution. 
This is the reason why identifying and analyzing factors that determine group loan repayment performance in 
DECSI microfinance institution was attempted; specifically those
manufacturing sector in Mekelle city. Besides, according to the manager of Semein branch of DECSI 
microfinance institution, the default rate that the institution is incurring now in group lending has its own 
significant contribution to the cumulative default rate of DECSI. This leads to increase in the overall annual 
default rate that is higher than the rate that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) set for all financial institutions, 
i.e., <5 percent (or >95 percent expect
Therefore, whether repayment of group loan is influenced by certain factors in a specific situation or influenced 
by group member themselves needs an empirical investigation so that the findings can be used by microfinance 
institution to manipulate its credit programs for the better.
 
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The objective of the study was to analyze the association of group, lender, and socio
group loan repayment performance of Dedebit Credit and Saving Institu
city.  
 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This section presents the research approach, description of the data type, data sources, methods of data collection, 
sampling design, sample size and methods of data an
Given the objectives and nature of this study, the study has applied an explanatory type of research that 
determines the association between the dependent and independent variables by using cross sectional data 
18.10% 10.29%
2009 2010
                               
) 
168 
-demography, group
among group members in gender, 
-demography among members. The group related factors are also those 
 
-2013) summary of group 
te) at semen branch DECSI microfinance institution is presented in Table 
2010 2011 2012 
753,500Birr 408,950Birr 7,188,473Birr 
675,917.42Brr 356,767.98Birr 6,094,387.50Birr
77,582.58Birr 52,182.02Birr 1,094,085.50Birr
10.29% 12.76% 15.22% 
Source: DECSI (2013) 
 
Source: DECSI (2013) 
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collected from the sample respondents from April 23 to May 14, 2014. 
5.1.1 TARGET POPULATION 
The target populations of this study were group borrowers in the manufacturing sectors and loan officer(s) of 
Semen branch DECSI microfinance institution residing in Mekelle city. 
5.1.2   DATA TYPE AND SOURCES  
This study has used primary data (both qualitative and quantitative types) collected from MSEs group leaders 
and DESCI’s loan officer.   
5.1.3  DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
This study has used structured questionnaire and depth interview, respectively, in order to collect primary data 
from group leaders and loan officer of DECSI. 
5.1.4  SAMPLING DESIGN 
This study has applied purposive sampling design to select the group leader respondents. It is because group 
leader is the one who looks after members of the group and he/she is assumed to know the required information. 
Besides, the study was census based by taking all groups currently on operation, because the number of groups 
are not large (i.e., they are 34 group leaders) and possibly manageable to take all groups in the selected sector 
(i.e., the manufacturing sector). 
5.1.5 SAMPLE SIZE 
This study has been conducted in DECSI microfinance branch in Mekelle city. Hence, according to the report of 
branch and sub-branch DECSI (2013), the total numbers of group borrowers organized as a cooperative in the 
manufacturing sector and currently on operation were 34. Hence, the study has covered only those 34 groups that 
were functioning in the manufacturing activities and financed by DECSI from 2009 to 2013.  
5.1.6 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION  
This study has applied the Chi-square test to test the statistical association of group, lender, and socio-economic 
factors with group loan repayment performance.  
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES  
Once the analytical procedure and its requirements are known, it is necessary to identify the potential 
explanatory and dependent variables, and describe their measurements. Different variables are expected to affect 
group loan repayment (the dependent variable). The major variables influencing the group’s loan repayment and 
the direction of their effect are presented and explained below.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT (Yi) 
Yi(s) is the binary variable that represents group loan repayment performance. Group loan repayment is defined as the 
act of paying back money previously borrowed from microfinance institution by all group members. It has a value of 1 
if group is non-defaulter otherwise 0, if default. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent variables are variables that are expected and have more explanatory power on the dependent 
variable, i.e., groups’ loan repayment. The independent variables that have been empirically identified and used 
in this study are: internal rule of conduct, peer pressure, homogeneities among member, self selection, external 
shock, loan size, suitability of repayment period, training, and loan supervision. 
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Table 3.2: Authors, code, measurement, expected sign and operational definitions of independent 
variables 
Authors Independent 
Variables 
Codes Operational definitions Measurement Expected 
Sign 
Bassem (2008); 
Manfred (1996); 
Zeller (1998) 
Internal rule  IRC It indicates that whether the 
group has internal rule of 
conduct to monitor members. 
It is expected that groups that 
have clear internal rules of 
conduct have a significantly 
higher loan repayment. 
Dummy variable (1= if 
it has rule, 0= if it 
hasn’t). 
Positive 
Bassem (2008); 
Ahlin and Townsend 
(2005);  
Wydick (1999) 
Peer pressure PP It refers to the will to exercise 
pressure on defaulters’ group 
members.  
Dummy variable (1= if 
make pressure to incite 
repayment,  0= if not). 
Positive 
Bassem (2008); 
Julia (1996); Umara 
and Iqbal (2013) 
Homogeneities 
among group 
member  
HOM It implies the homogeneity 
among group member and it is 
measured by average age 
range, sex, marital status, 
education level. The higher the 
homogeneity among members 
the higher loan repayment 
Dummy variable (1= if 
members are 
homogenous in 
composition, 0= if not) 
Positive  
Bassem (2008); 
Charlotte and 
Lodewijk (2003);   
Manfred (1996);  
Sharma and Zeller 
(1997);  Umara and  
Iqbal (2013);  
Zeller (1998) 
Self selection  SS It indicates whether members 
are organized by their own 
interest through selecting 
members or by another body. 
 
Dummy variable (1= if 
organized by their 
own, 0= if not by their 
own). 
Positive  
Abafita (2003); 
Onyeagocha et al. 
(2012); Umara and 
Iqbal (2013) 
Loan size LS If the loan size was higher and 
enough for the intended 
project, the chance of 
repayment is increased. 
Dummy variable (1= if 
loan granted is enough 
for the intended 
investment, 0= if not 
enough for intended 
purpose) 
Positive  
Abafita (2003) Suitability of 
repayment 
period 
SRP It is expected that member 
borrowers who find the 
repayment period suitable, 
perform better. Hence we 
expect a positive sign for this 
variable. 
Dummy variable (1= if 
repayment time is 
suitable and otherwise 
0). 
Positive  
Francis and Abel 
(2009); Julia (1996) 
Training  PLT It indicate that pre and after 
loan training for group 
members by DECSI 
microfinance institution.  
Dummy variable (1= if 
there is adequate 
training for members, 
0 otherwise). 
Positive  
Abafita (2003) Loan 
supervision  
LSP It refers to continuous follow 
up and supervision visit by 
loan officer to evaluate the 
loan utilization and repayment. 
It is expected to have positive 
relationship with loan 
repayment. 
Dummy variable (1= if 
there is timely 
supervision, 0= if not). 
Positive  
Manfred (1996); 
Onyeagocha et al. 
(2012); Sharma and 
Zeller (1997) 
External shock  EXS It refers to the sickness, market 
loss, family problem, etc of 
group members. 
 
Dummy variable (1=if 
the default reason is 
because of external 
shock, 0= if it is not 
because of external 
shock). 
Negative  
Source: Own Empirical Review (2014) 
Note: The above table is depicted on variable based order. 
5.2 LITERATURE DRIVEN HYPOTHESIS 
The hypotheses are driven after an extensive empirical literature review and the factors that are considered in this 
study are those factors which were considered in the previous studies. These factors are categorized in to group-
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specific factors, lender related factors, and socio-economic factor by following the classification in the empirical 
studies (Norhaziah & Mohdnoor, 2010; Olomola, 1998; Roslan & Mohd, 2009; Zeller, 1996; 1998). The 
expected association of these factors on the group loan repayment performance is hypothesized in the following 
section. 
5.2.1 GROUP-SPECIFIC FACTORS   
When loan is not repaid, it may be due to the character of the borrowers, borrowers’ unwillingness and/or 
inability to repay. Homogeneity among group members, self-selection, internal rule of conduct, and peer 
pressure are considered in this study as group-specific factors that affect group loan repayment. The effects of 
these factors are hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Groups that are homogeneous are predicted to have a higher probability of loan 
 repayment as compared to groups that are heterogeneous. 
Hypothesis 2: Groups that implement internal rule and regulation are predicted to have a  higher 
probability of loan repayment as compared to groups that didn’t  implement internal rule and 
regulation. 
Hypothesis 3: Groups formed with self selection are predicted to perform better in terms of  loan 
repayment as compared to the groups formed by other than member’s self- selection (by an 
outside agent). 
Hypothesis 4: The higher peer pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting  member, the 
higher the group performs good loan repayment. 
5.2.2 LENDER/ INSTITUTION RELATED FACTORS  
Loan defaults arise not only from problems with the borrower but also because of the problems with the lender 
(microfinance institution). Thus, in this study, the following four lender related variables are hypothesized as 
below: 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the loan size, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the group 
borrowers.  
Hypothesis 6: As suitable loan repayment period is set for borrowers, the probability of loan repayment 
increases. 
Hypothesis 7: As loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the probability of loan repayment by the 
groups is higher. 
Hypothesis 8: As training is available by DECSI MFI, the higher the probability of loan repayment by the 
groups. 
5.2.3 FACTOR RELATING TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS  
Although there are different socio-economic factors that can affect group loan repayment, this study took the 
critical socio-economic factor that affects group loan repayment, i.e., external shock. This involves different 
types of family emergencies, sickness, output market loss, major social events, etc. It is expected to affect 
performance of group loan repayment.  Thus, the following hypothesis is considered: 
Hypothesis 9: External shock is predicted to have a significant and negative impact on group loan 
repayment rate. 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
For the purpose of examining the determinants of group loan repayment performance, group owned MSEs 
operating in the manufacturing sector which has been financed by Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) 
from 2009- 2013 were taken as a target population for this study. Their total number was 34. Hence, this study 
has used census method to study the factors affecting loan repayment of this sector. Questionnaire was 
distributed for all group leaders of those currently functioning group owned MSE’s. All the distributed 
questionnaires were completed and returned (100 percent response rate). In addition, depth interview was carried 
out with randomly selected five group leaders and DECSI’s loan officer.   
6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS  
In this section, the group leaders’ demographic characteristics are presented with particular reference to age, 
gender, education level and marital status in Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1: Demographic Characterises of Respondents 
Category  Number  Percent  
Gender     
Male  29 85.29 
Female  5 14.71 
Total  34 100 
Education level     
Primary  2 5.88 
Secondary  3 8.82 
TVET/Diploma   17 50.00 
Degree  12 35.29 
Total  34 100 
Age     
18-25 2 5.90 
26-35 21 61.75 
36-45 11 32.35 
Total  34 100 
Marital status     
Single  15 44.12 
Married  18 52.94 
Divorced  1 2.94 
Total  34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
As indicated in Table 4.1 above, among the 34 respondents; 
 5(14.71 percent) of group borrowers were led by females and 29(85.29 percent) of group borrowers 
were led by males. 
 Majority (50 percent) of the group leaders have attended diploma (TVET) followed by first degree 
holder group leaders (35.29 percent). The remaining group leaders, 8.82 percent had secondary, and 
5.88 percent had primary education.  
 Group leaders in the age category of 18-25; 26-35 and 36-45 accounts 5.90 percent, 61.75 percent and 
32.35 percent, respectively.  
 44.12 percent, 52.94 percent and 2.94 percent were single, married and divorced, respectively.  
6.2  RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
6.2.1 STATUS OF GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT  
To know the loan repayment status, group borrowers were asked whether they have paid back fully or not paid 
successfully in the form of “Yes” or “No” response question. Such an objective response and direct measurement 
of the binary dependent variable (i.e., group loan repayment equal to “1” if groups were non-defaulters and “0” 
otherwise) was used to determine the factors that affect group loan repayment performance in similar studies of 
Bassem (2008), Julia (1996), Manfred (1996), and Zhang and Yoichi (2008). Therefore, both group borrowers 
paid successfully and those did not paid fully were taken into analysis for the identified common explanatory 
variables.  
Out of the total respondents 79.41 percent (27 groups) were able to repay the loan within the given maturity 
period, and hence they are creditworthy. Whereas the remaining 20.59 percent (7) respondents have defaulted on 
their loan and this implies that the borrowers are not creditworthy. In addition, loan officer was asked/ 
interviewed if the institution has any feedback from group borrowers as “What do you think is the reason 
borrowers fail to pay their loans?” Then the officer replied that borrowers often reason out market problem, 
mainly output market, and some borrowers also claim repayment schedule relating to amount and grace period. 
The following Figure 4.1 shows the status of loan repayment by the group borrowers.  
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Figure 4.1: Status of Loan Repayment by the Group Borrowers
It was well discussed in literature that less loan default rate is crit
(Norhaziah & Mohdnoor, 2013). Concerning this matter, annual reports of DECSI indicates that the loan default 
rate for DECSI is increasing from time to time, especially in the group lending (DECSI, 2013). This resu
found 20.59 percent default. Therefore, this high loan default rate might endanger the financial sustainability of 
DECSI.  
Reason for Engaging in Group Loan
credit was they had no collateral security that DECSI requires as guarantee for the money loaned. Table 4.2 
below reveals that out of the total group borrowers (34), about 47.06 percent responded lack of collateral security; 
required by DECSI (35.29 percent), and easy to get
loan. 
Table 4.2: Summary of Reasons for Engaging in Group Loan
Group Borrowers 
 Easy to get loan in 
group 
Response (n=34) 6 
Percent of response  17.65 
6.2.2  HYPOTHESES TESTING
6.2.2.1  LOAN REPAYMENT AND GROUP SPECIFIC FACTORS 
Group characteristics include composition (homogeneity) of group, initiation of group 
and internal rule and regulation of group borrowers. The description of these variables is provided below to 
indicate the mean difference between credit worthy and non credit worthy group borrowers in terms of loan 
repayment performance. 
a) LOAN REPAYMENT BY GROUP COMPOSITION AND INITIATION, AND COMPARISON OF 
NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The following Table 4.3 shows the comparison of non
compositions and initiation. 
Table 4.3: Distribution
Group-specific 
Factors  
Categories 
  
 
Composition of 
Group 
Homogeneous 
Heterogeneous 
Total  
 
Initiation of 
Group 
Self selection  
Non-self 
selection  
Total  
The homogeneity among group members is expressed in terms of group members has similar demographic 
                               
) 
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Source: Own Survey (2014) 
ical for financial sustainability of MFIs
: one of the major reasons, as stated by respondents, to engage in group 
 loan in group was their main reason for engaging in group 
 
Reason of Engaging in Group Loan 
It is required by DECSI MFI Lack of collateral security 
12 16 
35.29 47.06
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
 
 
members, peer pressure 
 
-defaulter and defaulter groups by using group 
 of Sample Group Borrowers by Composition and Initiation
Group Loan Repayment Total 
Non defaulters Defaulters  
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent
24 88.89 5 71.43 29 85.29
3 11.11 2 28.57 5 14.71
27 100 7 100 34 100 
25 92.59 2 28.57 27 79.41
2 7.41 5 71.43 7 20.59
27 100 7 100 34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
79.41%
20.59%
Loan Repayment
Non-defaulters Defaulters 
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2
  P-value 
  
   
 1.35 0.245 
 
 13.9* 0.000 
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characteristics. As described in Table 4.3 above, majority of group borrowers (85.29 percent) included in this 
study have homogeneous members in their demographic characteristics. Group borrowers that were 
heterogeneous in nature are found to make up 14.71 percent. With respect to perception of group borrowers 
about homogeneity in composition of group, 88.89 percent of the non defaulter group borrowers reflect that they 
are homogeneous, while 71.43 percent of the defaulter group borrowers replied that they are homogeneous group 
members. So, the relationship between group composition and group loan repayment performance seems to have 
positive relationship as expected. Additionally, this study shows that repayment status of heterogeneous groups 
which accounts 11.11 percent are non defaulters and 28.57 percent are defaulters.  
Group borrowers that were homogeneous in their composition are more likely to repay loan on time than 
heterogeneous group borrowers. This may be as a result of homogeneous group has members who understand 
each other’s feeling, discuss freely to give solution for any problem found among their members and committed 
to repay their loan within a given time or scheduled repayment period. However, the association between 
homogeneity among group members and between group loan repayment is not statistically significant according 
to the Pearson chi-square test statistics (Chi
2
=1.35, P=0.245).  
From this result it is possible to conclude that there is a difference in terms of loan repayment among these two 
groups (defaulters and non-defaulters) in terms of group composition (homogeneity), although the difference is 
insignificant according to Chi-square test statistics. 
The motive of the above Table 4.3 is to examine whether the way in which the group initiated has a difference 
on loan repayment performance on both credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers. Out of the total 
34 group borrowers incorporated in this study, 27(79.41 percent) of the respondents respond that their group was 
initiated based on members self selection while 7(20.59 percent) of the respondents replied that their group was 
formed by a promoter. There is significant difference between the two groups in terms of group formation (group 
initiation whether group is formed based on member self-selection or by an outside agent or promoter). 92.59 
percent of non defaulter group borrowers has been formed by themselves based on self selection whereas only 
28.57 percent of defaulter are formed by member self selection. This shows the existence of a positive relation 
between member self-selection and group loan repayment performance. Furthermore, the Chi-square analysis 
(Chi
2
=13.9, P=0.000) shows that there is a significant association between group loan repayment performance 
and group initiation at 1 percent significance level.  
From this result, it can be concluded that screening and selecting of creditworthy group member is more 
effective with groups that are formed by the members themselves because it is indicating a lower rate of loan 
default for these groups. 
Moreover, the loan officer of DECSI microfinance institution was interviewed with the questions “Who qualifies 
to borrow a loan from DECSI microfinance institution?” and “How group borrowers initiated/formed?” Then he 
said that first, the Bureau of Trade and Industry (BTI) screen the applicants and provides training to the selected 
applicants and finally the bureau transfers the selected applicants to DECSI and up on giving orientation to the 
applicants, DECSI provide (disburse) the loan to the applicants. According to the officer, the criterions for loan 
eligibility are clients should be dedicated to use the loan properly and repay it on time; clients with clean track 
record; above the age of 18 years and productive; have good credit discipline and no mental problems; be 
permanent residents of their respective areas; projects financed should be feasible and marketable; poor urban 
and rural people who are able to work and generate income; and no access to other formal financial institutions.  
The loan officer also added, groups can be formed on their own interest or can be initiated by an outside agent 
like by the city’s bureau of trade and industry. After that these groups must provide letter of application to the 
Bureau of Trade and Industry. The application letter should include name of the group (business), address of the 
group (business), description of the business and a memorandum of association signed by all members of the 
group. The Bureau of Trade and Industry then screens applicants as per the above mentioned criterion and send 
list of groups who passed the screening process to DECSI to get loan. 
b) LOAN REPAYMENT BY PEER PRESSURE AND INTERNAL RULE AND REGULATION, AND 
COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The next Table 4.4 presents the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using 
peer pressure and internal rule and regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Group Borrowers by Peer Pressure and Internal Rule and Regulation 
Group-specific 
Factors 
Categories Group Loan Repayment Total Chi
2
 P-value 
  Non defaulters Defaulters    
Freq Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq Percent   
 
Peer Pressure  
Have peer pressure 
among members  
23 85.19 2 28.57 25 73.53 9.15* 0.002 
Have no peer 
pressure among 
members  
4 14.81 5 71.43 9 26.47 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
 
Internal Rule 
and 
Regulation 
  
Have internal rule 
and regulation  
16 59.26 2 28.57 18 52.94 2.10 0.147 
Have no internal 
rule and regulation 
11 40.74 5 71.4 16 47.06 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
As Table 4.4 above shows 73.53 percent of borrowers have responded that they have made enforcement on loan 
defaulter members in the form of peer pressure to incite repayment rate whereas group borrowers that do not 
make peer pressure on default members represent 26.47 percent of the total observation. According to Table 4.4 
above, regarding to the peer pressure, 85.19 percent of non-defaulter group borrowers have responded that they 
have used different enforcement techniques on loan defaulter members that is called in group borrowers peer 
pressure (i.e., paying for him/her and then exclude from the group, reporting to the authority or loan officer, etc.) 
to incite repayment rate whereas defaulter group borrowers that made peer pressure on default members 
represent 28.57 percent. This shows that peer pressure among group members on defaulting members is 
positively related to group loan repayment performance.  Moreover, statistically there is significant difference 
between the two groups (non defaulters and defaulters) of borrowers in the loan repayment in terms of group 
initiation at 1percent significance level (Chi
2
=9.15, P=0.002).  
Therefore, it is possible to say that existence of peer pressure among group members proves to be positive and 
meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
Table 4.4 above revealed that relatively higher (59.26percent) of the non defaulter have internal rule and 
regulation in their group to manage conducts of their members while only 28.57percent of noncredit worthy 
groups have internal rule and regulation. However, as the test statistics (Chi
2
=2.10, P=0.147) shows there is no 
statistically significant mean difference between non-defaulters and defaulters in loan repayment in terms of the 
internal rule and regulation.  
Even though, it is statistically insignificant, from the result it is possible to conclude that group borrower that 
have internal rule and regulation are most probably repaying loan successfully as compared to defaulter groups 
and positively related to group loan repayment performance. 
6.2.2.2  LOAN REPAYMENT AND LENDER SPECIFIC FACTORS   
Lender specific characteristics are factors that affect the group loan repayment. These are suitable loan 
repayment period, loan size, loan supervision and training. Those factors that are expected to have a significant 
effect in this study are discussed below. 
a) LOAN REPAYMENT BY SUITABLE LOAN REPAYMENT PERIOD AND LOAN SIZE, AND 
COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The following Table 4.5 presents the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by 
using suitable repayment period and loan size.   
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Suitable Loan Repayment Period and Loan Size 
Lender 
Specific 
Factors  
Categories Group Loan Repayment Total Chi
2
 P-value 
  Non defaulters Defaulters    
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent   
 
Suitable Loan 
Repayment 
Period 
Suitable 
repayment period  
24 88.89 2 28.57 26 76.47 15.90* 0.000 
Not suitable 
repayment period  
3 11.11 5 71.43 8 23.53 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
 
Loan Size   
Sufficient  18 66.67 4 57.14 22 64.70 0.221 0.638 
Not sufficient  9 33.33 3 42.86 12 35.30 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
Loan terms such as the repayment period might affect the loan repayment by the borrower. In this study it is 
hypothesized that as suitable loan repayment period is set for borrowers, the probability of loan repayment 
increases which mean that group borrowers that found suitable loan repayment period make good repayment 
performance as compared to borrowers that not found suitable repayment period. As indicated in the Table 4.5 
above, the survey result shows 26(76.47 percent) of the respondents believe that the repayment period DECSI 
scheduled is suitable. Moreover, regarding perception of suitable loan repayment period 88.89 percent of the 
respondents who consider it as suitable are non-defaulters, which is greater than the corresponding figures for the 
defaulter group borrowers (28.57percent). This reveals that suitable loan repayment period is positively related 
with repayment performance. The remaining 8(23.53 percent) respondents believe that the repayment period set 
by DECSI is not suitable in which 5(71.43 percent) respondents are unable to settle the loan as per the 
established repayment schedule. Furthermore, when it is tested whether suitability of loan repayment has a 
significant association with loan repayment of group borrowers, Pearson chi-square value (Chi
2
=15.90 at 
P=0.000) reveals as there is significant difference between the two groups of borrowers in terms of suitable loan 
repayment period. 
However, according to the respondents response to an interview, the main reasons for unsuitability of repayment 
period is that starting time to repay is too early (i.e., 3 months grace period is not enough), repayment period is 
short and amount of payment per period is too high. Also loan officer was interviewed with the interview 
question “Whether the repayment period scheduled by DECSI consider the nature of business in the 
manufacturing or not?” Loan officer has replied that repayment period scheduled once for all borrowers 
including group borrowers operating in the manufacturing sector without considering types of activities going on 
in the sector (i.e., for all group owned MSEs in the manufacturing sector grace period is 3 months, amount of 
repayment per period is calculated in proportion to the loan size that can be completed in maximum three years). 
The respondents tried to suggest that it will be better if repayment period set to start repayment is increased on 
current grace period and the amount of each installment required to be decreased. 
As presented in Table 4.5 above, 22(64.70 percent) of borrowers responded that they received sufficient loan 
from DECSI microfinance institution whereas the remaining 12(35.30 percent) of borrowers responded that they 
do not received enough loan that match their intended purpose.  As presented in Table 4.5, with regarding to 
sufficiency of loan amount 66.67 percent of non defaulter borrowers responded that they received sufficient loan 
from DECSI microfinance institution whereas 57.14 percent of defaulter borrowers responded that they have 
received enough loan that can match to their intended purpose. Here majority of borrowers in the two types of 
group perceived that the loan amount received from DECSI microfinance institution is enough to accomplish 
their project. However, the chi-square statistics analysis (Chi
2
=0.221, P=0.638) shows there is no significant 
association between group loan repayment performance in terms of amount of loan received from DECSI 
microfinance institution.  
From this result, it can be summarized that the relationship between loan size and group loan repayment 
performance in some extent positive as expected, although the difference is statistically insignificant. This may 
be because larger loans are sufficient enough to generate cash flow for the borrowers. Furthermore, the larger the 
loan the higher is the penalty cost associated with any default and this puts more pressure on the group to reduce 
default. 
b) LOAN REPAYMENT BY LOAN SUPERVISION AND TRAINING, AND COMPARISON OF NON 
DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The Table 4.6 below reveals the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using 
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loan supervision and training.   
Table 4.6: Distribution Sample Group Borrowers by Loan Supervision and Training 
Lender Specific 
Factors  
Categories Group Loan Repayment Total Chi
2
 P-value 
  Non defaulters  Defaulters     
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent   
 
Loan 
Supervision 
Supervised  12 44.44 1 14.29 13 38.24 2.141 0.143 
Not 
supervised  
15 55.56 6 85.71 21 61.76 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
 
 
Training 
Trained  23 85.19 2 28.57 25 73.53 9.154* 0.000 
Not Trained  4 14.81 5 71.43 9 26.47 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
 
As indicated in the Table 4.6 above, out of the total observation, 61.76 percent of the respondents replied that 
they have not supervised by DECSI’s loan officers or staffs whereas 38.24 percent said that they have supervised 
by DECSI’s staff on how they are utilizing the loaned money. As indicated in the Table 4.6 above, out of the 
total non defaulter group borrowers, only 44.44 percent of the respondents replied that they have supervised by 
DECSI’s loan officers or staffs whereas 14.29 percent of defaulter said that they have supervised by DECSI’s 
staff on how they are utilizing the borrowed fund. This study implies that loan supervision by DECSI’s staffs has 
a positive relationship with group loan repayment performance. Here on loan supervision loan officer is 
interviewed to know if there is any loan supervision is made by DECSI staffs with interview question “How 
frequent should visits to borrowers be made by your institution?” Then he reported that even though loan 
supervision made so far is not enough because of mismatch between large number of clients and the existing 
number of loan officers, there is follow up by loan officer on how group borrowers are utilizing the borrowed 
fund for intended purpose. Even if it seems like there is slight mean difference in loan repayment performance 
among non defaulter and defaulter group borrowers, the difference is statistically insignificant according to the 
chi-square test (Chi
2
=2.141, P= 0.143).  
With respect to before loan and after loan training to group borrowers from DECSI, Table 4.6 above revealed 
that out of the total 34 group borrowers included in this study, 25(73.53 percent) of them have got training 
relating to saving, recording and loan utilization while only 9(26.47 percent) of group borrowers do not get 
training. As it is indicated on the above Table 4.6, with respect to training for group borrowers from DECSI, 
there is significant difference between the two groups, since 85.19 percent of non defaulter received training 
while only 28.57 percent of defaulter groups gotten training. This clearly exhibits that the more borrowers get 
training from microfinance institution, the more they perform good loan repayment. This implies that there is a 
positive relationship between training and group loan repayment performance. 
 In addition, DECSI loan officer was interviewed whether microfinance is delivering training for group 
borrowers or not and if so type of training delivered with interview questions “Are any pre and post loans 
training available for group borrower through your institution?” and “Who deliver this training and on what 
area(s) it focuses?”Accordingly, the officer replied that the institution deliver training for any borrowers 
including group borrowers with collaboration of Mekelle City MSEs office before granting the fund (before loan 
training). Specifically, how to utilize loan, monthly repayment and saving are the kind of training that DECSI 
deliver according to the officer. Moreover, the Pearson chi-square statistics (Chi
2
= 9.154, P=0.000) shows that 
there is significant association between group loan repayment performance and training.  
6.2.2.3  LOAN REPAYMENT AND  SOCIO-ECONOMIC SPECIFIC FACTORS  
There are different socio-economic factors that can affect group loan repayment, but this study took the critical 
socio-economic factor that affect group loan repayment, i.e., external shock. 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY EXTERNAL SHOCK, AND COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND 
DEFAULTERS 
The following Table 4.7 shows the comparison of non defaulter and defaulter group borrowers by using external 
shocks. 
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Table 4.7: Distribution of Group Borrowers by External Shock 
Socio-Economic 
Factor 
Categories Group Loan Repayment Total Chi
2
 P-value 
  Non defaulters Defaulters    
Freq Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent   
 
 
External Shock    
Faced external 
shock  
2 7.40 5 71.43 7 20.59 13.94* 0.000 
Not faced 
external shock 
25 92.60 2 28.57 27 79.41 
Total  27 100 7 100 34 100 
Source: Own Survey (2014) 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
The motive of Table 4.7 above is to examine whether socio-economic factors, i.e., external shocks makes a 
difference at all on group loan repayment of both credit worthy and noncredit worthy group borrowers. The 
survey result presented in the Table 4.7 above, reveals that out of the total 34 group borrowers incorporated in 
this study only 7 (20.59 percent) of respondents replied that in their group members has encountered some 
external shocks and these groups have a highest loan default, which is 5(71.43 percent) of the groups have 
defaulted with only 2(7.40 percent) groups repaying the loan on time. This implies that the relationship between 
external shocks and loan repayment performance seems to be negative as expected. Besides, the chi-square 
statistics (Chi
2
=13.9356, P=0.000) reveals that there is a significant association between group loan repayment 
and external shocks. This is due to external shock involved different types of family emergencies, income/market 
losses, etc in the short term as reported by respondents.  Thus, from this result it can be summarized that as the 
number of group member facing shocks increase, the probability of group loan default increases.  
Generally, the above sections (6.2.1 – 6.2.2) dealt with the descriptive statistics and Chi-square test statistic to 
compare non defaulter and defaulter group borrowers and to indicate the significance of the mean deference 
between the two groups in terms of each explanatory variable. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1  CONCLUSIONS  
This study was intended to analyze the statistical association of the determinants of group loan repayment with 
the group loan repayment performance. It covered determinants of group loan repayment performance by 
considering group specific, lender specific and socio-economic specific factors.  
First, the study analyzed about the status of group loan repayment (group borrowers that do not defaulted and 
defaulted on their loan) followed by analysis of demographic characteristics of respondents. Secondly, the study 
dealt with group specific factors, such as group composition (homogeneity), group initiation (self-selection), 
peer pressure, and internal rule and regulation. Thirdly, it also analyzed lender specific factors/variables such as 
extent of suitability of loan repayment period set by DECSI microfinance institution, loan supervision, loan size 
and training. Finally, the study dealt with socio-economic factor that determine group loan repayment, i.e., 
external shock that was assumed to have significant influence in determining group loan repayment performance.  
Therefore, based on the research findings, the following conclusions are drawn:  
 Regarding the status of group loan repayment, it has been found that about 79.41 percent of group 
borrowers were non defaulters and about 20.59 percent of them were defaulters. It was also found that 
the basic reasons as to why members want engaging in group borrowing are lack of collateral security 
to take loan individually when they want, required by DECSI, and easy to get loan in group than on 
individual basis. 
 Groups with homogeneous group members showed the highest percentage loan repayment as compared 
to groups with heterogeneous members.  
 Groups initiated based on self-selection of members themselves showed good loan repayment 
performance as compared to those groups initiated by other than member self selection (by outside 
agent or promoters).  
 Existence of peer pressure among group members proves to be positive and meaningfully contribute to 
improve the group loan repayment performance.  
 Internal rule and regulation, even though, it is statistically insignificant, group borrower that have 
internal rule and regulation are most probably repaying loan successfully as compared to defaulter 
groups and positively related to group loan repayment performance. 
 Those groups (MSEs) who seek suitable repayment period were found to be good performers in loan 
repayment as compared to those MSEs who do not found suitable repayment period.  
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 Group borrowers who supposed that granted loan size is enough to conduct the intended investment 
poorly perform loan repayment than those group borrowers agreed granted loan size is not as much 
enough to carry out investment.   
 The more borrowers get training from microfinance institution and the more they get continuous 
follow-up (loan supervision), the more they perform good loan repayment, although these variables 
found statistically insignificant.  
 In relation to external shock, as number of group member facing shocks increase, the probability of 
group loan default increases.  
 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above conclusions drawn, the following recommendations are forwarded: 
As per the discussion held with the loan officer of DECSI, one reason for low loan repayment by MSEs is wrong 
credit perception of borrowers. That is borrowers consider loan as donation and opted-not-to pay back. Therefore, 
DECSI should create awareness among clients before disbursing loan through giving short training about its 
objectives (i.e., its source of funds and convincing them the advantages why they are required to repay back the 
borrowed fund) that the loan has to be repaid so that DECSI can have sustainable and viable operation. This 
enables DECSI to reach millions of poor people in the region thereby eradicating poverty. 
The homogeneous group, self initiated groups, and peer pressure groups (i.e., groups with strong social ties) 
were found to have statistically significant association with loan repayment performance. Thus, DECSI should 
consider these factors while screening group borrowers. This could reduce significantly loan default and DECSI 
is sustaining since creditworthy borrower can be selected from the very beginning. 
The other factor related to the lender-specific factor which has significant association on loan repayment 
performance is loan size. In order to make group borrowers run effective business, the availability of sufficient 
loan size is one important factor. Thus, it is recommended to compare loan size with the business proposal of the 
client before loan disbursement and should revise the rule and regulation of the institution based on the current 
economic condition of the country. 
Suitable loan repayment period was found to have significant association on loan repayment performance. 
Therefore, DECSI should set business and income based suitable loan repayment period (i.e., enough grace 
period, amount repayment per period, and repayment time) as per the type of businesses in the sector.  
Although continuous follow up and supervision is important for loan repayment, there is no enough supervision 
made by loan officers. This is due to the increasing number of clients in the institution. Therefore, it is 
recommended to make the number of clients and loan officers comparable. In recent years, the institution has not 
giving enough training for the clients specially post loan training.  
External shock was also found to have significant association on loan repayment performance. Most of these 
groups operating in the manufacturing sectors have witnessed lower loan repayment performance. This sector 
has lower loan repayment due to shortage of market for their output and frequent increase in price of inputs that 
the sector uses. As number of group member facing external shocks increase, the probability of group loan 
default increases. Therefore, especial attention is needed by the concerned stakeholders (DECSI, Bureau of 
Trade and Industry, and Regional MSEs development agency) in creating market linkage to sell their output; and 
sustainable supply of inputs at fair price until these group owned MSEs build capacity to operate on their own. 
Especial attention is also needed for this sector because the sector can play decisive role in reducing 
unemployment level in the city since the sector is labor intensive. 
Finally, this study finding may not be used to generalize about the determinants of the group loan repayment 
because the study has focused on only the manufacturing sector and confined only to the Mekelle city. The study 
has only through a light on the factors that determine group loan repayment performance. Thus, comprehensive 
and comparative studies are recommended in order to have holistic picture on the group loan repayment 
performance by considering wide area and all the MSEs subsectors. 
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